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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
  
 California Coast University (“CCU” or the 
“University”) appeals from the District Court’s order affirming 
an award of attorneys’ fees and other relief to its former 
student, Jaime Aleckna.  When Aleckna filed for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, she still owed CCU tuition.  The filing of her 
bankruptcy petition, however, imposed an “automatic stay” of 
all collection actions against her, and therefore enjoined the 
University from attempting to recover that debt during the 
course of the proceedings.1   
 
While her case was pending, Aleckna, who had 
completed her coursework, asked CCU to send her a copy of 
her transcript.  The University responded but would only 
provide her with an incomplete one that did not include a 
graduation date, explaining that a “financial hold” had been 
placed on her account.2  Aleckna eventually filed a 
counterclaim against CCU in the Bankruptcy Court arguing 
that it violated the automatic stay by refusing to provide her 
with a complete certified transcript.  The Bankruptcy Court 
found in Aleckna’s favor, concluding that she was entitled to 
receive her complete transcript, as well as damages and 
attorneys’ fees because the University’s violation was 
 
 
1  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (providing that a 
bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, . . . of . . . any act to 
collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case”). 
2  App. 871. 
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“willful.”3  CCU appealed to the District Court, arguing that its 
violation could not have been “willful” under this Court’s 
decision in In re University Medical Center,4 which provides a 
limited defense in some cases.   
 
On appeal, we must first decide whether University 
Medical remains good law in light of subsequent amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code—specifically, to § 362, which governs 
alleged violations of the automatic stay.5  We conclude that it 
does, but that CCU has failed to establish a defense under that 
case.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
  
I.   
 
Aleckna was a student at CCU until 2009, but she 
stopped making tuition payments some time that year.  By the 
time she filed for bankruptcy, she still owed CCU 
approximately $6,300, which she initially characterized in her 
schedules as “disputed” debt.6  Aleckna informed the 
 
 
3  In re Aleckna, 543 B.R. 717, 722, 725 (Bankr. 
M.D. Pa. 2016); see also In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 
F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that a violation is 
willful where (1) “the defendant knew of the automatic stay,” 
and (2) its “actions which violated the stay were intentional”) 
(quoting In re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1989)).   
4  973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992). 
5  11 U.S.C. § 362. 
6  Educational loans are generally non-
dischargeable in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy unless the “debt 
would impose an ‘undue hardship’ on the debtor.”  United 
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University that she had filed for bankruptcy and requested 
copies of her transcript for her files.7  As a matter of policy, 
CCU has not invoked the legal process to recover debts owed 
by its students.  Instead, the University will consider any 
student with a past-due balance to have not technically 
graduated and may withhold the student’s transcript or diploma 
as a result. 
   
After some back-and-forth regarding the status of her 
bankruptcy case, CCU eventually sent Aleckna copies of her 
transcript, but no graduation date was listed on them.  Aleckna 
inquired about the missing date and was informed that she did 
not technically graduate due to the financial hold on her 
account.  CCU then filed an action in the Bankruptcy Court 
seeking an order declaring that Aleckna’s debt was a non-
dischargeable educational loan.  In response, Aleckna filed a 
counterclaim against CCU arguing that the debt was 
dischargeable and the University violated the stay by failing to 
 
 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 263 (2010) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328).  When she first filed her 
petition, Aleckna was not sure whether CCU considered her 
debt to be a non-dischargeable student loan or something else, 
which is why she classified it as “disputed” in her bankruptcy 
schedules.  As set forth below, CCU eventually did argue that 
the debt was a non-dischargeable student loan, but later 
withdrew its challenge with prejudice.  See App. 807-09. 
7  Aleckna also testified that she needed a copy of 
her transcript so that she could apply to graduate programs in 
the future.   
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issue her a complete transcript.8   In other words, Aleckna 
asserted that the University’s withholding of her transcript was 
an unlawful attempt to collect on pre-petition debt.9  The 
University still refused to provide her with a complete 
transcript and opposed her counterclaim, but later agreed to 
withdraw its non-dischargeability action with prejudice.10  This 
withdrawal was essentially a concession that Aleckna’s debt 
was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code and would be 
extinguished upon termination of the proceedings.11   
 
A bench trial was held on Aleckna’s counterclaim after 
CCU unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment.  The 
 
 
8  The parties dispute whether Aleckna explicitly 
raised this argument in her counterclaim when it was first filed, 
but they do not dispute that she later amended the counterclaim 
to specifically include allegations that CCU violated the stay 
by refusing to provide her with a complete transcript and 
degree.   
9  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).   
10  CCU’s statement that its challenge was 
dismissed “without prejudice . . . since it was not necessary to 
have the issue of dischargeability decided,” Appellant’s Br. at 
15 n.4, seems to blatantly misrepresent the record, see App. 
816 (order of the Bankruptcy Court dismissing CCU’s 
complaint “with prejudice”). 
11  See Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2020) (“A dismissal with prejudice 
‘operates as an adjudication on the merits,’ so it ordinarily 
precludes future claims.”) (quoting Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 
829, 832-33 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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Bankruptcy Court concluded that a “final transcript, with no 
graduation date, [is] akin to a letter of reference with no 
signature,” and was essentially useless.12  The Bankruptcy 
Court determined that because providing an incomplete 
transcript is tantamount to providing no transcript at all, CCU 
had violated the automatic stay.  The Bankruptcy Court also 
found that CCU’s violation was “willful,” so it awarded 
Aleckna damages and attorneys’ fees associated with litigating 
the transcript issue.13  As of 2016, those fees had climbed to 
approximately $100,000.  
  
CCU appealed to the District Court arguing, among 
other things, that the award of damages and fees was improper 
under University Medical.  In that case, we held that a 
defendant does not “willfully” violate the automatic stay if the 
law governing the alleged violation was “sufficiently 
uncertain.”14  CCU contends that, at the time of its violation, 
the law may have required it to provide a transcript, but did not 
explicitly require it to provide Aleckna with a complete one 
that included a graduation date.  The District Court rejected this 
defense, noting that CCU could not point to any persuasive 
authority supporting its position, and affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order.15  This appeal followed.16   
 
 
12  In re Aleckna, 543 B.R. at 725. 
13  Id. at 726. 
14  Univ. Med., 973 F.2d at 1085, 1088. 
15  Cal. Coast Univ. v. Aleckna, No. 3:16-cv-00158, 
2019 WL 4072405, at *1, *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2019). 
16  Aleckna first argues that CCU has waived or 
forfeited its right to assert a University Medical defense by 
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II.17 
 
On appeal, CCU does not argue that its conduct did not 
violate the automatic stay; rather, it maintains that it did not do 
so willfully, and that the District Court erred in affirming the 
award of damages and fees.  
    
We must first decide whether this Court’s decision in 
University Medical has been legislatively overruled.  Like 
 
 
failing to raise this argument before the Bankruptcy Court.  
Though the Bankruptcy Court generally discussed related 
concepts, its analysis does not mention University Medical.  
However, because the District Court considered the defense at 
length, the applicability of University Medical is a question of 
law, and it is unclear whether Aleckna raised a waiver or 
forfeiture argument before the District Court, we will consider 
it on appeal.  See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“[This Court is] reluctant to apply the waiver doctrine 
when only an issue of law is raised.”).  Alternatively, Aleckna 
argues that even if the issue has not been waived or forfeited 
entirely, it is still not properly before the Court because 
University Medical established an affirmative defense that was 
not pled in CCU’s answer as required.  We need not resolve 
that issue because we conclude that the defense is not satisfied 
regardless.  
17  The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
158(d) and 1291.  We review the District Court’s legal 
conclusions de novo.  In re Bocchino, 794 F.3d 376, 379-80 
(3d Cir. 2015).  
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CCU, the defendant in University Medical argued that its 
violation was not “willful,” and it was therefore not liable for 
damages and attorneys’ fees.18  When University Medical was 
decided in 1992, the applicable § 362 provision stated that 
“[a]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay . . . 
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ 
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive 
damages.”19  The statute was silent on whether a “good faith” 
defense existed in any context, but we had previously held in 
In re Atlantic Business & Community Corporation that a 
defendant’s good-faith belief that its actions complied with the 
stay did not, on its own, establish a defense to willfulness.20   
 
In University Medical, however, the defendant not only 
acted in good faith, but was able to show that the law 
surrounding its violation was “uncertain,” and relied on 
persuasive authority to support its position.21  We held that 
while “good faith” alone was insufficient, the “uncertain” 
nature of the issue coupled with the defendant’s reliance on 
persuasive authority negated any finding of willfulness, and the 
 
 
18  973 F.2d at 1085. 
19  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1990).   
20  901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (awarding costs 
and fees and explaining that “[n]otwithstanding [the stay 
violator’s] claim that he acted in good faith, there is ample 
evidence to support the conclusion that he acted intentionally 
and with knowledge of the automatic stay as a result of the 
pending bankruptcy proceedings”).   
21  973 F.2d at 1088. 
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defendant was therefore not liable for certain damages and 
costs:  
 
A willful violation does not require a specific intent 
to violate the automatic stay. . . . Here, however, the 
actions of the [defendant] were neither in defiance 
of a court order nor were they contrary to . . . 
section[] 362 [of the Bankruptcy Code].  
[Defendant] believed in good faith that he was not 
violating the stay.  This of course is not sufficient 
under Atlantic Business to escape liability. . . . 
However, [defendant] also had persuasive legal 
authority which supported his position. . . . [W]e 
conclude that the withholding by [defendant] did not 
fall within the parameters of “willfulness” as such 
actions have been described in Atlantic Business and 
that [defendant] should not be penalized for the 
position [it] took . . . .22 
 
 In 2005, the relevant provision was amended and is now 
§ 362(k).  Section 362(k) provides that an individual who 
commits a willful violation is liable for damages and attorneys’ 
fees unless “such violation is based on an action taken by an 
entity in the good faith belief” that the stay had terminated due 
to the debtor’s failure to file a timely notice of intention.23  
Because § 362(k) can be read to establish a good-faith defense 
that is narrower than the one articulated in University Medical, 
 
 
22  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
23  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)-(2); id. § 362(h).  This 
exception indisputably does not apply here.   
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several bankruptcy courts within our Circuit have concluded 
that the case has been statutorily overruled.24  Aleckna agrees 
with those decisions, and her reasoning tracks that of a 
Pennsylvania bankruptcy court in In re Mu’min.  That court 
concluded that University Medical was “judicial gloss” on the 
pre-amendment Code and is therefore no longer good law.25  It 
explained that in enacting § 362(k), “Congress provided for 
only a limited, statutory good faith exception” that is “more 
limited than the one expressed in University Medical.”26  
Accordingly, the court concluded that § 362(k) overruled our 
 
 
24  See, e.g., In re Mu’min, 374 B.R. 149, 168 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); In re Lightfoot, 399 B.R. 141, 149-50 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Mu’min, 374 B.R. at 168-69); In 
re McWilliams, 384 B.R. 728, 730 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2008) 
(recognizing University Medical as superseded by statute as 
recognized in Mu’min).  Aleckna also points to one district 
court decision from within this Circuit that acknowledged this 
position but declined to apply it.  See In re Seymoure, Nos. 07-
4960, 07-4967, 2008 WL 1809309, at *3 n.3 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 
2008) (“The Mu’min court held that [the University Medical] 
exception [no longer] exists.  T[his] [c]ourt, however, declines 
to apply the holding of the Mu’min court as Debtors’ Chapter 
13 applications were filed prior to the amendments to 
§ 362(k).”).   
25  Mu’min, 374 B.R. at 168. 
26  Id.  
 
 
12 
 
existing case law.27  Several courts have since followed or 
otherwise agreed with the Mu’min decision.28   
  
In the present case, however, the District Court 
concluded (and at least one other court has agreed)29 that 
University Medical did not create the sort of “good faith” 
defense contemplated by § 362(k).  Rather, the District Court 
found that University Medical merely provides a mechanism 
for defendants to challenge a finding of “willfulness,” and § 
362(k) does not speak to that particular element.  The D.C. 
bankruptcy court summarized the distinction as follows: 
 
Some decisions characterize [University 
Medical] as creating a “good faith” exception . . . 
But the defense to a finding of “willfulness” . . . 
is not a defense of good faith, and (as in civil 
contempt law) is a defense, separate and distinct 
from good faith, that when the law is sufficiently 
unsettled, willful violation of the statutory 
command is absent, and damages are not 
recoverable, because the offending party has not 
acted in violation of a command of which it had 
fair notice.30 
 
 
 
27  Id.  
28  See, e.g., Lightfoot, 399 B.R. at 149-50; 
McWilliams, 384 B.R. at 730. 
29  See In re Stancil, 487 B.R. 331, 343-44 (Bankr. 
D.C. 2013). 
30  Id. at 343. 
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 At least one of our sister circuits has recognized this 
subtle but important distinction before, explaining that even 
though University Medical may sometimes be read as 
establishing a general defense of good faith, “decisions from 
within the Third Circuit demonstrate that courts did not read 
[that case] so broadly.”31  Indeed, “[i]n a decision issued only 
eight months after [University Medical], [this Court] itself 
reaffirmed that . . . ‘a creditor’s “good faith” belief that he is 
not violating the automatic stay provision is not determinative 
of willfulness under § 362[].’”32   
 
The District Court agreed with this rationale,33 and so 
do we.  On its face, § 362(k) does not provide a means to 
disprove willfulness—rather, it says that where a willful 
violation occurs, a defendant is nevertheless not liable for 
certain damages so long as it believed in good faith that the 
stay had terminated.34  University Medical, on the other hand, 
 
 
31  IRS v. Murphy, 892 F.3d 29, 37-38 (1st Cir. 
2018).   
32  Id. (quoting In re Lansdale Family Rests., Inc., 
977 F.2d 826, 829 (3d Cir. 1992)); see In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 
657, 664 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting the same).   
33  Aleckna, 2019 WL 4072405, at *3 (citing 
Stancil, 487 B.R. at 344). 
34  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)-(2) (“[A]n individual 
injured by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees . . . [unless] such 
violation is based on an action taken by an entity in the good 
faith belief that subsection (h) applies to the debtor.”).  
Subsection (h), which does not apply here, provides that when 
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provides a theory by which defendants can challenge the 
“willfulness” element in its entirety.35  The District Court also 
noted that federal courts should be “reluctant to accept 
arguments that would interpret the Bankruptcy Code to effect 
a major change in pre-[amendment] practice, absent at least 
some suggestion in the legislative history that such a change 
was intended.”36  Because there has been no such suggestion 
here, the District Court concluded that University Medical 
remains good law, but ultimately determined that CCU failed 
to establish a defense under that case regardless. 
 
While recognizing the apparent tension between a § 
362(k) “good faith” defense and University Medical,37 we 
 
 
the debtor is an individual, the stay terminates with respect to 
certain personal property if the debtor fails to timely file a 
statement of intention.  Id. § 362(h). 
35  973 F.2d at 1088-89.   
36  Aleckna, 2019 WL 4072405, at *4 (quoting In re 
VistaCare Grp., 678 F.3d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2012)).  
37  University Medical provides a defense to 
“willfulness” where the defendant believes its actions were 
lawful based on persuasive authority.  973 F.2d at 1088.  But, 
somewhat paradoxically, “[w]illfulness does not require that 
the creditor intend to violate the automatic stay provision, 
rather it requires that the acts which violate the stay be 
intentional.”  In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 123 (3d Cir. 
2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In 
Denby-Peterson, we also recognized that § 362(k) provided 
only “one exception” to the rule that debtors injured by willful 
violations may recover certain costs.  Id. at 123.  Importantly, 
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ultimately agree with the District Court.  In establishing the 
defense, the University Medical decision clearly did not intend 
to, and insists that it did not, create a “good faith” exception 
like the one later established in § 362(k).38  Despite some 
overlap, we continue to read University Medical as establishing 
a “willfulness” defense that is separate and distinct from one 
of good faith alone.  We, like the District Court, observe no 
direct conflict between University Medical and § 362(k) and 
conclude that University Medical remains good law. 
 
 
 
however, that case did not consider the possible application of 
a University Medical defense.  In short, though some of the 
relevant case law reflects a struggle to maintain the slight (but 
meaningful) distinction between a “willfulness” defense under 
University Medical and a “good faith” defense under § 362(k), 
our precedent does not require a different conclusion than the 
one we reach today.  For this reason, we need not address 
CCU’s argument that the Supreme Court has rejected a strict-
liability standard for violations of a bankruptcy discharge.  See 
Appellant’s Br. at 33-37 (citing Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. 
Ct. 1795 (2019)).   
38  973 F.2d at 1088.  Absent rehearing of the full 
Court, it is not our practice to second guess whether it should 
have done so.  See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 
9.1 (“It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel 
in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a 
precedential opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc 
consideration is required to do so.”); see also United States v. 
Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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III.  
 
University Medical, however, does not help CCU.  
Unlike the defendant in University Medical, CCU has not 
pointed to any compelling persuasive authority that supports 
its position.  Instead, the University predominantly relies on 
the absence of case law addressing these precise facts.  We 
have found no authority that addresses the specific issue of 
whether a college violates the stay by refusing to provide a 
transcript that affirmatively includes a graduation date.  But a 
lack of case law to the contrary does not render the law 
sufficiently unsettled under University Medical.39  Rather, the 
defendant must point to authority that reasonably supports its 
belief that its actions were in accordance with the stay.40  CCU 
has not done so here.41   
 
CCU argues that two bankruptcy courts within our 
Circuit have held that a college does not violate the stay by 
 
 
39  973 F.2d at 1088. 
40  Id. at 1089 (noting that the defendant’s actions 
were “taken in reliance on statutory direction and case law 
support” and therefore “were not ‘willful’”).   
41  CCU also stresses that at the time it refused to 
provide Aleckna with a complete transcript, her student debt 
had only been characterized as dischargeable but had not 
actually been discharged.  This is because dischargeable debt 
is not formally extinguished until the debtor completes making 
payments under the restructuring plan.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1328(a).  CCU fails to show, however, why that distinction 
would make any difference in this case.  It has not cited any 
on-point, persuasive case law that would justify its apparent 
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refusing to give a student-debtor any transcript—complete or 
not—and that these cases led it to reasonably believe that its 
actions were permissible or perhaps even generous.42  But the 
 
 
belief that its conduct complied with the stay—regardless of 
whether the debt was “dischargeable” or “discharged.”  
Instead, it admittedly relies only on the general “law of 
discharge, the lack of any contrary authority, and the lack of 
any authority dealing with this issue” in making its point.  
Appellant’s Br. at 33.  The lack of authority to the contrary or 
silence on a particular issue is not tantamount to a reliance on 
“persuasive legal authority.”  Univ. Med., 973 F.3d at 1088.   
42  See In re Billingsley, 276 B.R. 48, 51-52 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 2002); In re Najafi, 154 B.R. 185, 189-91 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1993), abrogated by In re Mehta, 310 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In addition to those cases, CCU also claims that this 
Court has previously considered this issue and endorsed its 
view in Johnson v. Edinboro State Coll., 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Though Johnson did consider whether a college may 
retain a debtor’s transcript in some cases, that case is 
distinguishable because it involved the non-discrimination 
provision contained in Bankruptcy Code § 525.  Id. at 164-65; 
see 11 U.S.C. § 525(c)(1) (“A governmental unit that operates 
a student grant or loan program . . . may not deny a student 
grant[] [or] loan . . . to a person that is or has been a debtor 
under this title.”).  It did not involve an allegedly willful 
violation of the stay under § 362.  As the District Court noted 
below, Johnson is not on point.  Aleckna, 2019 WL 4072405, 
at *5.  Even if we were to accept CCU’s argument that the 
“non-discrimination” principles in Johnson overlap with those 
under § 362, see Billingsley, 276 B.R. at 51-52, that case is still 
not on point, as it involved non-dischargeable student debt.  
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cases on which CCU relies are distinguishable.  In In re 
Billingsley, the bankruptcy court concluded that the school did 
not violate the automatic stay by refusing to turn over a 
transcript because the debt in that case was “concededly 
nondischargeable.”43  Likewise, in In re Najafi, the debt at 
issue was determined to be an “advance of credit” or 
“educational loan” that was also non-dischargeable under the 
Bankruptcy Code.44  Here, Aleckna claims that, at the time of 
trial, her debt had not yet been formally discharged because she 
 
 
Johnson, 728 F.2d at 165 (“Johnson’s loans have not been 
discharged, indeed they are nondischargeable, and whatever 
remedies he may have against the college withholding the 
transcript, he cannot seek relief under § 525 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”). 
43  276 B.R. 48, 52 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002). 
44  154 B.R. 185, 189-90 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), 
abrogated by In re Mehta, 310 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2002).  In 
Mehta, this Court criticized the Najafi court’s interpretation of 
Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8), which exempts “educational 
benefit overpayment[s] or loan[s]” from bankruptcy discharge, 
noting that it unnecessarily “inserted commas into the relevant 
sections . . . and interpreted the statute as it read after that 
[incorrect] change in punctuation.”  310 F.3d at 316.  We note 
that Billingsley has also been criticized by other courts.  See, 
e.g., Mu’min, 374 B.R. at 163 (disagreeing with the court’s 
reliance on our decision in Johnson, which did not involve a 
§ 362 violation, and for overlooking another “critical factor” 
not dispositive here).    
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was still making payments pursuant to her restructuring plan.45  
But nothing in the record suggests that the debt was ever 
considered a non-dischargeable student loan by the Bankruptcy 
Court, as was the case in Billingsley and Najafi.  To the 
contrary, CCU voluntarily withdrew its challenge with 
prejudice, indicating that it did not contest Aleckna’s position 
that the debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
To the extent Billingsley and Najafi are still relevant 
(though distinguishable), we note that many other federal 
courts, including three of our sister circuits, have endorsed 
Aleckna’s contrary view in similar, though not identical, 
contexts.46  The two outlier cases on which CCU relies do not 
 
 
45  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (discharge generally 
cannot be entered until after the debtor “complet[es] . . . 
[making] all payments under the plan”).   
46  See Appellee’s Br. at 26-28 (collecting cases); In 
re Kuehn, 563 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming an 
award of damages and fees for the university’s failure to 
provide a transcript, even though the debt at issue may have 
been non-dischargeable); In re Gustafson, 111 B.R. 282, 288 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (finding a willful violation where the 
school refused to provide the debtor with a transcript, even 
though the debt at issue was presumptively non-
dischargeable), rev’d on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 
1991); In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that the university violated the stay for refusing to 
provide a transcript even though the debt was presumptively 
non-dischargeable); see also In re Parker, 334 B.R. 529, 534-
36 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2005) (school violated the stay by 
refusing to allow a student to register for classes); In re Moore, 
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create a split of authority to render the law unsettled within the 
meaning of University Medical.47  Indeed, the University’s 
purported belief that it was not required to provide Aleckna 
with any transcript based on those cases is seemingly 
inconsistent with its ultimate decision to send her a copy, albeit 
an incomplete version.  
  
Because the University has failed to show that the law 
regarding the transcript issue was sufficiently unsettled within 
the meaning of University Medical, we agree with the District 
Court that its violation of the stay was willful. 
 
IV. 
  
CCU’s final argument is that the District Court erred in 
awarding damages and attorneys’ fees because there was no 
affirmative injury in this case.  To recover such relief, the 
debtor must be “injured” by the stay violation.48  CCU argues 
 
 
407 B.R. 855, 860-61 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (university 
violated discharge injunction by refusing to provide a student-
debtor with a degree).   
47  See In re Theokary, 444 B.R. 306, 323 n.30 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (declining to apply the University 
Medical defense where the relevant legal principles were not 
“universally recognized” but were also not “the subject of any 
robust judicial debate”).   
48  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (“[A]n individual injured 
by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in 
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that Aleckna did not sustain any meaningful “injury” from her 
delayed receipt of a complete transcript.  It recognizes that she 
was awarded $230.16 for the time she took off from work to 
attend trial, but claims that this was the only tangible harm she 
incurred, and that it was improper to tack substantial attorneys’ 
fees onto this modest amount.  But CCU cites no authority for 
its position that a debtor’s lost wages from attending trial, even 
if a modest amount, is not a legitimate financial harm.49  Nor 
does CCU provide a compelling explanation as to why the 
attorneys’ fees do not constitute a financial injury on their own.  
Indeed, this Court has previously acknowledged that a debtor 
may suffer “financial injury in the form of attorneys’ fees” 
 
 
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”) 
(emphasis added). 
49  Though the facts are not identical, Aleckna has 
cited several bankruptcy cases where debtors were awarded 
similar financial relief.  See, e.g., In re Grochowski, Nos. 5:06-
bk-51666-JTT, 5:11-ap-00223, 2012 WL 5306047, at *1 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2012) (awarding damages for 
postage, gas to attend trial, and lost wages); In re Meyers, 344 
B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (awarding compensation 
for lost wages “incurred by [the debtor’s] use of one paid 
vacation day”); In re Chambers, 324 B.R. 326, 331-32 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2005) (awarding $336 in compensatory damages 
where the debtor “needed to miss three days of work . . . to 
address the [d]efendant’s conduct”).   
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when they are incurred to “enjoin further violations of the 
stay.”50   
 
 In any event, Aleckna identifies several additional 
forms of relief awarded by the District Court that address her 
injuries, including:  (1) three copies of her certified transcript 
containing a graduation date; (2) a diploma; and (3) the pre-
litigation attorneys’ fees she incurred while attempting to 
obtain her complete transcript.51  Though the award of a 
transcript and diploma is non-monetary, the automatic stay is 
intended to protect “both financial and non-financial 
interests.”52  Thus, even if the financial harm to Aleckna was 
 
 
50  Lansaw, 853 F.3d at 668.  
51  The parties dispute whether Aleckna was 
actually awarded “pre-litigation” fees—i.e., the “defensive” 
attorneys’ fees she incurred attempting to resolve the issue out 
of court before the litigation ensued.  Appellee’s Br. at 55-56.  
We need not resolve that issue here, however, because we 
conclude that Aleckna was injured by the University’s 
violation of the stay regardless. 
52  Lansaw, 853 F.3d at 667-68 (“[W]e see no 
reason to infer that Congress intended to distinguish between 
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries when it adopted a 
system of compensatory damages as a means of enforcing stay 
violations.”).  Though CCU correctly notes that Aleckna was 
unable to show an “actual loss” with respect to future career or 
educational opportunities, the Bankruptcy Court did not—
contrary to the University’s assertion—conclude that Aleckna 
suffered no losses across the board.  See Aleckna, 543 B.R. at 
725 (“No evidence was presented that Aleckna had applied to 
any master’s program.  Nor was any expert vocational or expert 
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arguably small, her failure to receive a complete transcript 
without court intervention constitutes a cognizable injury 
under § 362.53  
 
In reaching the same conclusion, the District Court 
relied partially on the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re 
Parker, in which a student-debtor was unable to register for the 
next semester’s classes because she still owed the school 
money.54  CCU contends that Parker “is inapposite since . . . 
the condition precedent injury [in that case] was the [student’s] 
inability to register for classes.”55  But just as the refusal to 
allow a student to register for classes “deprives [her] of a 
service that would be available to her were she not a debtor,” 
so does “[t]he act of withholding a debtor’s transcript.”56  The 
record confirms that if Aleckna were not a debtor, she would 
have been entitled to receive a transcript confirming her 
graduation.  Aleckna was therefore deprived of a service—the 
 
 
testimony offered to show any projected loss of future earnings 
due to the . . . delay in obtaining a [degree] from [CCU] . . . It 
is not for the Court to speculate as to possible losses and I 
cannot find actual loss in this regard.”) (emphasis added).   
53  See Gustafson, 111 B.R. at 288 (“An award of 
attorneys[’] fees is appropriate ‘where a debtor must resort to 
the courts to enforce his or her rights in consequence of a 
violation of the automatic stay.’” (quoting In re Stucka, 77 B.R. 
777, 784 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987))).   
54  334 B.R. 529, 532-33 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2005). 
55  Appellant’s Br. at 49. 
56  Parker, 334 B.R. at 534. 
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voluntary provision of a complete, certified transcript—that 
would have been otherwise available but for her existing debt. 
 
The District Court therefore did not err in concluding 
that Aleckna had been “injured” by CCU’s violation.  The 
award of damages and attorneys’ fees was appropriate.    
   
**** 
  
Though we conclude that University Medical remains 
good law, the District Court correctly found that CCU failed to 
establish a defense under that case.  Likewise, the District 
Court correctly decided that Aleckna had been injured by 
CCU’s violation and was therefore entitled to damages and 
attorneys’ fees. 
   
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
